I think there are some very good reasons not to be realists about mathematical objects. What might our metaphysics of mathematics need to look like to defend nominalism?

I explain Van Inwagen's 'SCQ' and examine some potential resolutions, including mereological nihilism, mereological universalism, organicism and more.

What is Theseus' Paradox? I examine some potential solutions, and consider what our answers tell us about the metaphysics of identity and of identity change.

What is an object? When do objects compose further objects? I explore the metaphysical issues in this philosophical introduction to objecthood and the nature of reality.

I propose a system of meaning for existence monists, and argue that the monist can claim exceptional parsimony as a motivation for their ontology.

Existence monism is the view that there is exactly one object – the cosmos. It's often met with an incredulous stare. I defend the view in this post.

Are objects identical with regions of spacetime, or do objects exist separately and occupy regions of spacetime? I defend the former thesis, known as supersubstantivalism.

Not every philosopher wants universals to be part of their ontology. Here are four ways that we might approach denying their existence.

Śūnyatā, the Doctrine of Emptiness, is a tenet of Mahāyāna Buddhism - yet it is still one of the most widely misunderstood concepts.

You can point at sheep, you can point at restaurants - but not at numbers. What makes maths real - if anything?

David Lewis is my hero. I also disagree emphatically with almost everything he says, and think his philosophy is ludicrous.